Sudan–South Sudan Relations\(^1\): From Colonial Period to Present Times

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ABSTRACT---- This paper deals with Sudan-South Sudan relations since 1955. The British colonial system administered two practical political entities (north and south Sudan) separately under one governor general. Paradoxically, it unsuccessfully tried to unite them as one entity by granting independence to former Sudan as a whole. Hence, the contradictions inherited from the colonial legacy continued to be practiced by the post-independence leaderships of Sudan. They continued to forcefully unite the south with the north. But at last South Sudan achieved independence and established relations with Sudan. This paper attempts to answer whether the relations of the two countries led to conflict or cooperation or both in the post-1955 and post-9 July 2011 period. Most scholars argue that the dominant and rigid Arab elite in the north failed to accommodate the interests of the black Sudanese in the south. This contributed to the state of affairs to date in the relations of the two countries. Hence, this paper largely focuses how the rigid stand of the northern elite eroded the prospects of cooperative relations and agreements of the two states that led to frequent conflicts which in turn led to the division of former Sudan into two. It also examines the type of relations between the two countries after 9 July 2011.

Keywords— South Sudan, Sudan, conflict, civil war, cooperation, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, relations, resources, independence, referendum, mediation

1. INTRODUCTION

In the colonial period, the Anglo-Egyptians used to administrator Sudan as two political entities under one governor general. South Sudan stayed separately in a closed administration to the north. This system effectively blocked any type of relations between the two regions (Benjamin in Kock, 2011:8). But when the British prepares to extend independence to Sudan, they started to think Sudan as one rather than two separate regions. This policy changed the northern elites to reside over the political power of Sudan in terms of key administrative positions to dominate the rest, the south in particular. Hence, the British decided in the 1946 Sudan Administrative Conference to unite the two regions that were used to be administered in a separate and different system and to make power under the domination of the northern elites (Ylonen, 2005:108). This move contradicted and denied the history of South Sudan in the colonial time administration which provided a separate administration, language, culture and traditions.

More specifically, the official administrative language of the south, which had been English during the Anglo-Egyptian administration changed to Arabic. The language policy favoured northerners in the administrative and other positions and prevented Southerners. For example in 1954, out of the eight hundred administrative posts, southern Sudanese were provided only with six junior level positions in the south (Heraclides, 1987:217; Mamdani, 2010:217; Taisier and Matthews in Ylonen, 2005:108).

The various regimes of Sudan that followed its independence preferred to sustain these contradictions and wanted strongly to unite the two regions in a single state. Due to this, however, half-heartedly the South Sudanese leaders also accepted, in the 1947 Juba Conference, the unity of Sudan with a condition that their rights in the national and in their local politics, economy, culture, religion and tradition were respected by the northern elites (Ylonen, 2005:109). But these rights were continued to be violated by various governments in the post-independence period of the Sudan.

Since 1955 Sudan and South Sudan entered into a destructive conflict as the Islamic north promoted a policy of domination over the non-Islamic south. Sudan’s governments and political parties supported this view against the south.

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But Sudan under Numeiri, in a very different breakthrough brokered a peace deal that briefly helped the south to exercise some autonomy that led to cooperative relations with the north. This liberalist conception of cooperation and interdependence could not sustain as the north wanted more power to regain the lost/reduced power in the south. This strengthened the realist argument that cooperation could not be feasible in a competitive state system accompanied by military power that led to conflict in the Sudan-South Sudan case. This was evidenced by the post-1983 destructive conflict by the two parties and its continuation in a reduced form after 2005. This is due to the rigid Islamic leadership of Sudan, the influence of its political culture in the relations of the two countries, and lack of radical compromise from Sudan in some of the impasses after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At least the last one has to be addressed if the two countries seek to operate side to side in peaceful and cooperative coexistence that will contribute to their state viability.

Relatively speaking, except positive cooperation developments during the period of the Addis Ababa Agreement under Numeiri and after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 under Al-Beshir, most of the pre-2005 period Sudan-South Sudan relations were characterized largely by domination and conflict than that of cooperation with the less developed and marginalized south.

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, an agreement that was supposed to lead to long term peace and cooperation for Sudan and South Sudan, failed after a decade of the exercise of relative peace and cooperation between the two regions. Moreover, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the long running conflict led first to a semi-autonomous South Sudan under the cooperative arrangement of one country two systems. This agreement, after 9 July 2011, led to an independent state of South Sudan, is also very volatile and sometimes followed by frequent destructive conflicts between the two states. Can we explain Sudan-South Sudan relations as one of conflict or cooperation? Or both? Or is there any other explanatory variable that can better explain the relations of the two parties in the post-1955 period?

This paper tries to explain the type of the relations between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-1955 Sudanese leadership and including the post-9 July 2011 relations of the two states. More specifically, the paper will explore the type of relations of the two countries from the perspective of realism’s and liberalism’s/idealism’s conflict and cooperation issues, respectively. In other words, the paper tries to answer how the relations going on between the two countries explain either conflict or cooperation or both.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Interstate relations is defined as relationships or interactions among various actors that participate in the relations of one another including states, sub-national entities such as bureaucracies, local governments as well as individuals, among others (Mingst, 1999:2). However, the content of the relation may comprise mainly of cooperation on agreeable issues or conflict on contentious issues among states and local entities. Hence, at least for our case, relations comprise political or economic issues among states in the form of negotiation/diplomacy, military aspects, alliances, and foreign policy. Within all of these issues, decision makers of one state may act in cooperation or conflict according to the situation. This means that extending either cordial or hostile behaviours towards the other state (Goldstein, 2003:4) is one of the features of interstate relations.

Yet, the main players of the relationship as actors of the relations are governments of countries. Hence, it is the decisions and actions of those governments, in relation to other governments, that constitute the content of interstate relations. But, though states are the primary actors in interstate relations (Henderson, 1998:20), the international stage is full of other actors (small and large) that are closely interacted with the decisions of governments of states (Ibid). As a result, non-state actors such as political parties, armed groups, among others, are being increasingly recognized as important in interstate relations. The government of the state consists of those persons who constitute the organs or organizations which make and enforce law, and conduct policy (Ibid). Government is an agent of the state, and represents and acts on behalf of a state. It is because of this that one can argue relations between states are largely relations between governments.

This appears to be that many international relations theories are relevant to our point of discussion, for instance, realism and liberalism are the most important approaches of interstate relations which served as to reflect on Sudan-South Sudan relations.

The theory of realism argues that states may be concerned with raising citizen’s standard of living and national and international moral values. However, these goals must ultimately remain subordinate to ensuring state’s survival. This is because without survival, all aspirations and interests of states will not be fulfilled (Roy, 1998:228-29). For this, state leaders should know very well how to advance their states interests using power as an instrument of survival and sustaining political power. Politics for realists is a struggle for power among states, individuals and ethnic groups each
trying to increase their interests through the mechanism of bargaining, alliances, with negotiation/diplomacy as the main instrument for complementing various national interests (Goldstein, 2001:57). Hence, the most vital tool accessible for states’ policies is military power. For realism cooperation is restricted by fear of vulnerability and the control by foreigners/others. Moreover, every state is affected by relative gains problem in that even though two states would gain by cooperating, one would be likely to gain more than the other. This creates winners and losers. With this situation, the expected loser would probably refuse for cooperation (Roy, 1998:228-29).

The Republic of Sudan as most African countries is a colonial creation that especially received two colonial administrations, i.e., Sudan and South Sudan, inside the territory of the former Sudan. The two regions particularly after independence from the British colonial rule and after South Sudan’s independence from Sudan exhibited a problematic relations of cooperation or conflict or both in various times. What is the type of relations between these regions after 1955? Is cooperation/conflict really explaining their relations? The elites in the south claim that non-responsive Islamic-oriented/dominated regimes in the north that failed to understand the features of South Sudan avoided all options of practically available cooperative relations, agreements and sustained the conflicting relations between the two countries. This is the main subject of study in this paper.

Sudan-South Sudan’s relations may be explained by this perspective that there is advantage in the realist assumption that moral and related concerns are secondary to their interests to gain more power. This is because realism explains political and economic outcomes through the exercise of power (Baylis and Smith, 1999:4). Realist explanation would identify Sudan’s policy on South Sudan as motivated by its defence of political and economic interests such as oil and other benefits as it wants to gain more to create a win-lose situation in their relations. Accordingly, Sudan is now a self-interested external actor in its relations with South Sudan with a practical interest on oil revenue for its own benefit and survival. Finally, realism looks forward Sudan’s external behaviour to follow its relative capabilities and position in the regional distribution of power. More specifically, Sudan after the beginning of its oil exports tried to make itself confident through oil revenue is influencing other countries such as South Sudan (fully dependent on the oil pipelines, refineries and port of Sudan) and Ethiopia (fully dependent on its oil imports) through high benefits from cooperation.

The other theoretical perspective of interstate relations, liberalism (also early called idealism) underlined, as opposed to realism, the need for cooperation among states and states have the capacity to respond to the moral values and principles of their citizens (Goldstein, 2001:112). Through this, governments can learn to settle disputes peacefully and reduce destructive behaviours including war (Roy, 1998:231). According to liberalism, rather than working for conflicting national interests states promote the establishment of a new system based on morality and legal principles (reform of the status quo). To this end, the main thing is making states to realize that all states would be better off in a world of cooperation, interdependence and respect for international law. Liberals have given great attention to the potential of conflicts and competition to develop into cooperative relationships as states identify and recognize mutual benefits as most successful in the long run (Goldstein, 2001:112). There is a need of working out international settings where cooperation can be best accomplished (Baylis and Smith, 1999:5). This is through governments as well as regional and international organizations as the main actors in some-issue areas of relationships. However, liberalism as that of realism gives importance to the state. Unlike realism, for liberalism states’ national interest is more than military capability (Ibid).

States have to bargain with all sorts of other actors, with the result that their freedom to act as they might wish is seriously reduced (Ibid). Liberalism believes that war can be avoided from human knowledge and practice (Burchill et al., 1996:33) in an attempt to secure mutual benefit. Furthermore, due to its advantage of mutual benefit among states, interdependence, cooperation and reciprocity are very much emphasized (Goldstein, 2001:113).

According to the expectations and views of liberalism, Sudan and South Sudan seem to accept the liberal premise that cooperation in their oil resource is the most promising way of strengthening their state for development to kick off among them. With these conceptions, official Sudanese and South Sudanese positions would favour a more classical liberal approach that emphasizes the benefits on issues that will reduce and change competition and conflict to cooperation, interdependence and mutual benefit between the two states.

Both theories have provided significant tools of analysis for explanations of the relations of the two countries. Especially, the realist view underlines states desire for the maximization of benefits against their partners either in conflicts or cooperation; for relations have to continue the state has to survive before concern for the moral and standard of living for the citizen. As emphasized by liberalism, concepts of interdependence, cooperation, and mutual benefits are very important and helpful for the establishment of more peaceful relations among states. On the basis of these understandings of the theoretical and conceptual analysis of interstate relations, the next sections of the paper would be analysed.
3. **SUDAN–SOUTH SUDAN RELATIONS: UNDERSTANDING A HISTORY OF TWO SEPARATE PERIODS**

3.1 **Pre-independence relations**

In the colonial time, Sudan was divided and administered in two ways. The predominantly Arab-Islamic oriented north was excluded and ruled as a separate territory from the south. The south was divided into closed districts to protect the territory from Arab slave traders, the expansion of Islam and Arabs. Hence the south was effectively excluded from Arabic language and Islamic faith. Peculiarly, the south was allowed freely to move further south to Uganda and Kenya without any permission from the colonial authorities. But Southern Sudanese were not allowed to pass to northern Sudan without pass permit (Kock, 2011:8). Therefore, the south was completely blocked from Arab influence in the north. However, it permitted them to develop at their own pace in their lines (Gray, 1971:113; Heraclides, 1987:217). Hence, this deliberate policy led to the development of independent identities between the two regions.

The paradox from Sudan leadership is that, almost all leaders failed to recognize this recent historical fact, but always resort to violence to forcibly unite the south which could not be united given the existing identities and historical circumstances, among others.

However, a certain scholar has argued that the British officials were uncertain on the ultimate destiny of the south lay with Uganda and East Africa or with the North (Gray, 1971:113). It seems that the British were not ready to act responsibly in its decisions on the final exit strategy from south. The hopeless Southerners were aware of such signs of the British in the 1947 Juba conference, where they were insisting for a federal status to the south after independence. But the British were completely unprepared for the complete change of their policy that was suddenly disclosed in 1947. Gray interestingly continued to argue that, despite warnings of the danger of leaving the south with the north without any arrangement at the final day of independence, the British under the pressure of Egyptians and northern Sudanese rushed to grant independence to Sudan on 1 January 1956 (Ibid).

However, this independence did not brought peace and unity to the Sudan rather tensions erupted between the north and south (Barker, 2008:14). The failure of the British to provide the south closed districts at least the right to self-determination at the time of independence of Sudan was one of the major grievances that instigated the first civil war in Sudan (Knock, 2011:8) in the pre-independence period. The southerners were demanding for a federal framework that neither the British in the eve of independence nor the Sudan leadership after independence were willing to accept and extend to the south (Heraclides, 1987). The civil war started in opposition to all of these in a form of violence which culminated in the Equatoria Corps Mutiny of August 18, 1955 (Scott, 1985:241).

This was considered as a prelude to future conflict after independence. This rebellion was followed by a long term armed struggle of the people of the south against the domination of the north that unfolded in two phases: the first being from 1963-1972 and the second just after the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement from 1983-2003 (Ibid). The continuation of such conflicts after independence is assured hereafter especially by the instigation of Sudan’s leaders.

Sudan had experienced dozens of governments after independence. But, the paper analyses the type of relations of Sudan and South Sudan under the following two governments, namely Gafaar Numeiri and Al-Beshir. However, before that the paper briefly assesses the kind of relations these regions had under Ibrahim Abboud.

3.2 **Post-independence relations**

3.2.1 **Relations under Ibrahim Abboud**

After coming to power in 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud declared a top-down nation building project of Arabisation for Sudan. According to Mandomi, Abboud declared that "there must be a single language and a single religion for a single country" for Sudan (2010:217). From the outset of his presidency he was officially denying most of the key rights and questions of South Sudan. This had also the tendency of excluding South Sudanese from the political process of the state. This state of affairs led and enforced policy of Arabisation totally turned upside down Britain’s south policy of 1922-1947 in a very short time. Arabic became the official language of government offices and schools. Friday replaced Sunday as the official public holiday (Ibid).

These very radical polices designed against the rights of South Sudan had far reaching implications in the relations of the two regions. For the south this had a further motivating factor and evidence in their full-fledged future conflict with Sudan where the governments that followed him also continued to consolidate these stances in their destructive fight against the south. However, a more long lasting impact in the future of South Sudan and Sudan in general and also in the
relations of Sudan and South Sudan in particular happened in the following regimes of Gafaar Numeiri and Al-Bashir that the paper will analyse in the next sections in relative details.

3.2.2 Relations under Gafaar Numeiri: reign of cooperation and conflict

Numeiri with his military colleagues came to power in the Sudanese politics in a bloodless coup in 1969. One of the reasons that elevated him to the power was his critics against the previous civilian governments of Sudan for mishandling the South Sudanese problem as it was maintaining disunity and hatred in the country (Wai, 1979:301). This was a positive national policy gesture and was a signal that he is committed to solve the pressing problem of the time, the issue of South Sudan. However, preceding governments in Sudan followed a hard-line approach to the problem and preferred military solutions.

The party politics and alignment in the Sudan was also dominated by pan-Arab influences with sustained neglect of issues of South Sudan. Major political parties consider Sudan as an Arab nation and neglected its black population in the south. After the coming of Numeiri too they continued to influence the balance of power in favour of their interests (Ibid). However, he preferred to play a politics free from sectarian influences. He created three alliances: working with the Communist Party, alliance with the Southern Sudan and Islamists. The regime had one thing in common with them, which is a modernist agenda in the Sudan’s politics (Mamdani, 2010:223). With this strong back drop, he preferred to play the two cards of Sudan that it has accorded by its location at the crossroads of Arab-Africa at the same time and inclined to one in another time in its foreign relations.

Especially after his early alliance with the Communist Party ended with the communist’s abortive coup of 1972, he opted to play the South Sudan African card. Even though the Islamic nationalists and Communist Party had agreed with him for South Sudan that the civil war would end through peaceful means, they failed to agree on the key reforms for the south. The Communist Party argued in its program that the south needs not "democracy" but "development" in the form of providing preferential access for resources to develop. However, South Sudan should agree to a national program implemented by a national leadership in Khartoum in return for autonomy. But the south rebel movements had refused to accept this exchange. In the meantime, the new coalition of non-communist nationalists got the opportunity to work with Numeiri in the search for another way of reform for the south, including but not limited to regionalization (Ibid).

Hence Numeiri, within three years’ time in the history of the Sudan, was prepared to agree a regional autonomy for the south. This was realized in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 that was designed to settle the southern problem under the framework of the United Republic of the Sudan (Scott, 1985:79). This in effect assured the end of the first civil war of the Sudan that started just four months before independence. This settlement was reached between Numeiri of Sudan and Joseph Lagu of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement in Addis Ababa. The agreement provides the promulgation of a new constitution in 1973 for the Sudan that included the issues in the Addis Ababa Agreement (Scott, 1985:79; Stevens, 1976:248). These two events made South Sudanese to rally for the achievements of the two leaders (Barker, 2008:16). They started to hope that the agreement will proved a lasting peace, freedom, stability and economic progress for the south.

The Addis Ababa Agreement outlined clear practical principles for the establishment of political and administrative organs for South Sudan. The major points of the agreement are discussed in the following ways: The agreement argues that the provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile constituted as self-governing Regions within Sudan and called the Southern Region. These regions were allowed to exercise legislative and executive organs whose functions were decided by the constitution. It grants the central government the usual powers of national defence, foreign relations, printing money and coins, among others.

The People’s Regional Assembly had given the power to exercise regional legislation in the Southern Region. The election of the Assembly is by the citizens residing in Southern Region in a secret ballot.2The other is the chapter on the executive. In this case the Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the president. The council specifies the duties of Southern Region on matters relating to Central Government Agencies and it acts with the approval of the president. Moreover, the agreement provides that the citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizable proportion of the People’s Armed Forces (of the national government) in reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region (Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972).

Therefore, it is argued that in such a breakthrough the agreement for the first time granted regional autonomy for South Sudan and Juba became the capital of the region (Scott, 1985:79).

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2For details see page 2-3 of the agreement.
Whatever rational he had in mind, the Numeiri regime from the beginning was committed to cooperate first to build his power base and help build the south. As part of his new southern policy, he established a ministry of Southern Affairs, a development fund for the south; he recruited southern policemen, even his guard from the south, among others. He reached to the extent of establishing the department of Christian Affairs in the ministry of education, (Alier in Shinn, 2004:241) a practical policy major unthinkable before a decade or less.

Most scholars argue that the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement was not free of difficulties. But the will and respect for the deal was there from the leadership and it reached well to the 1980s. Until this time it allowed South Sudanese to decide their affairs under the democratically elected regional government of their own choosing which extended regional autonomy (Heraclides, 1987:213). Of course whether this autonomy was a genuine one or supported by Numeiri’s manipulation is always under the debate of scholars in the discipline.

Numeiri’s cooperative relations with South Sudan received the Pan-Arabist opposition and even this led Babikier Awadalla to resign from the vice-presidency and some others exiled to Cairo (Wai, 1979:307). However, the Communist Party, Islamists and South Sudanese gave support to his initiative. From the external powers such as Libya under Gadaffi and some Arab countries as well as the Soviet Union were not interested in the peace agreement with the south. As a result they distanced themselves from the international call to help Sudan in its plan to implement the peace settlement.

The major issue that required the outside world’s help was the issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees in South Sudan. However, as Numeiri had already paid enormous political capital in the peace deal and for that Sudan needs aid in millions of dollars to make the peace agreement workable. The ending of the civil war in Sudan in a peace agreement alone brought more internal and external prestige to the nation. There was also an emphasis for domestic peace settlement in South Sudan. South Sudan deal served as a good reason to turn to the countries willing to help the processes underway in the South (Ibid).

The changed political climate in Khartoum led to a confrontation with the Soviets, but facilitated the improved relations with the West. For example, as a result of the improved relations with the US, Washington organized a campaign for resettlement and rehabilitation of South Sudan and this resulted to a grant of $18 million. After some time, total sum of US contribution to the south problem reached some $30 million (Wai, 1979). As argued by liberalist/idealist perspectives, foreign policy, diplomacy and alliances proved to be helpful in cooperative arrangements and in this case became an instrument to finance domestic programs and problems.

Especially, after the reversal of the nationalization policy of Numeiri, foreign interest grown in the Sudan. A related stimulating factor was also the increasing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa that forced the US to provide more generous policy of assistance to the Sudan. Thus, competition and conflict would force countries to enter into cooperation and mutual benefits as observed here underlined the predominance of idealist views of interstate relations. The British also revived its business interest in the Sudan and committed some 450,000 Sudanese pound in aid for South Sudan Relief Fund. More assistance continued including from the Arab countries and China. Most of the assistance was used for the rehabilitation and resettlement in South Sudan following the peace agreement (Ibid).

However, these cooperative gestures and practices with South Sudan and other countries from Numeiri could not last long more than a decade. Starting with early 1980s, in line with the realist views; he began slowly to decline from his cooperative stance and skillfully eroded the peace settlement. Moreover, many difficulties became a barrier for the continuation of the deal as well. There were pervasive suspicions, as also argued by realism, from the southern population on the implementation of the agreement. There were also a few scattered violence incidents underlining the view that civil wars could not be resolved or avoided by a single peace agreement (Kasfir in Shinn, 2004:244). This also explains the realist views that wars cannot be avoided from the operations of states and human practices. This is because there were more armed opposition forces by the time in the south that were not included in the agreement.

One of the major causes for the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was to re-divide the south into three regions in a way to return back to pre-Addis Ababa Agreement. The northern enemies of Numeiri were mounting series pressure on the agreement. As a result he raised the issue in February 1980 at the central committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union. Most southern representatives opposed the issue. But he opted a number of ways to the re-division in 1981 and 1982 (Scott, 1985:79). Finally, after he failed to convince the southerners on the rationales of his plan of development through re-division, Numeiri with that of the only support of Lagu violated the constitution and announced on 5 June 1983 the Republican Order Number 1 that re-divided the south into three regions (Shinn, 2004:254).

The Addis Ababa Agreement defined the three regions as Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as they existed on 1 January 1956 as borders between the two regions. Southerners believed at this time that other areas such as Abyei which is culturally and geographically a part of the south should be decided by referendum (Shinn, 2004:252). The attempt to
redraw the border between north and south especially after the discovery of oil in 1978 was another constraint for the Addis Ababa Agreement. By this Numeiri wanted to include the oil discovered areas under the jurisdiction of northern Sudan. This was followed by huge opposition from Southerners. However, oil was not an issue in the Addis Ababa Agreement as there was no oil by the time. But there was implicit provision on the agreement that provide the issue of oil rights to the central government (Ibid: 248). Similarly, Numeiri regularly intervened in southern affairs. Moreover, quantity of military deployment from north to south violated the one-to-one ratio of southerners to northerners in the military (Ibid: 245). Hence, the issue of military relationships were also causing greater tensions than any other issue (Kasfir in Shinn, 2004:245) in the north-south relations after Addis Ababa Agreement. Last but not least, the imposition of the September 1983 Sharia laws on the indigenous non-Islamic community was another setback to the Addis Ababa Agreement (Wakoson in Shinn, 2004:254).

These major grievance failures, among others, by the Numeiri regime negatively affected their relations in the post-Addis Ababa Agreement. The south forced to resort to their military solution of the old continued problem in a new form in 1983. Some argued that this time (after 1983) the war started mainly as a result of new resource (oil) discovered in the south (Kock, 2011:12). However, I do not fully agree with this view. Rather we can argue that the war transferred to this stage due to the inability of Sudan to carefully manage the conflict and failure to equally share the resources and power with the south. Moreover, the increasing interest of the Sudanese leadership to return back to the pre-Addis Ababa Agreement situation of domination is also another factor that led to their win-lose relations afterwards as explained by realism.

This was followed by a full-fledged conflict by Numeiri against Battalions 105 and 104 located in the garrison towns of South Sudan after the soldiers refused to go to north by his order. John Garang (used to work in the National Army as a military planner) was sent from the central government to convince them to move to the north, but he himself feeling disappointed by the developing events in South Sudan defected to join a new movement in the south which in August 1983 emerged as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). In June and July 1983 warfare occurred in Abyei and Bentu in South Sudan. As the determination to destroy South Sudanese forces became clear due to the increasing conflict as a result of the war mongering leader, southern military leaders reorganized and regrouped themselves in neighbouring countries. They were successful in establishing various rebel groups, the SPLA/M being the dominant one by the time (Scott, 1985:71).

With its original base in Gambella\(^3\), the rebel group launched a serious of attacks on the central government forces. At this time, Gaddafi of Libya was working to overthrow Numeiri by any means including an alliance with the black African force of SPLA. This helped Garang to secure the Libyan aid. The Mengistu regime of Ethiopia as well was supporting the SPLA as Ethiopia want to maintain friendly relations. On the other hand, Numeiri obtained substantial military and financial support from the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Ibid: 77).

Unlike the SPLA, the pre-1983 groups of guerrilla fighters of South Sudan lacked unity and political control. These movements led by a series of leaders were working to separate South Sudan from Sudan. These guerrilla groups under the rubric of Anya Nya I were also characterised by ethnic rivalries, among others, which limited their resources (Heraclides, 1987:221) and influenced their cause for self-determination. Some also argue that the civil war at this time was characterized largely by identity and religious issues (Kock, 2011:12) that may be one of the reasons for the presence of more armed groups. In addition to the SPLA another organization of the south was operating during and after 1983, namely Anya-Nya II with its political wing, Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. But after clashes with the SPLA in mid-1984, the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement had disintegrated leaving the stage for SPLA for the long run.

It is argued that now with the changed objective of creating a ‘United Socialist Sudan’ (Heraclides, 1987:228) and a strong power, the SPLA started increasing pressure on the Sudan leadership. One of its successful attacks afterwards was SPLA’s attack on Chevron’s oil operation near Bentu. At this time Anya-Nya II and SPLA together completely shut down Chevron’s activity in South Sudan by the end of 1984 (Garang, Woodward in Shinn, 2004:249).

Even though Numeiri was overthrown by the army take over in April 1985, the SPLA continued its struggle as the installation of the new regime was largely considered by the SPLA as a continuation of the old regime and refused to talk with them (Scott, 1985:79). The issues of South Sudan were once again transferred to another round of Sudan’s leaderships as a problem without any political and military solutions.

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\(^3\)The SPLA is established in this western most point of Ethiopia.
3.2.3 Relations under Al-Beshir: conflict to cooperation?

On 30 June 1989 a military coup replaced Mahdi’s coalition\(^4\) party by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (Salih, 1990:221). It announced a list of decrees that band every aspect of life in the country. According to Osman Salih, "[the decrees were signed by Lieutenant-General Oman Hassan al-Bashir, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation and new Head of State, who also became Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces" (1990:222). It organized as a positive step, "a well-attended month-long ‘national peace talks conference’ that ended in October 1989." The Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation also declared that the revolution is a Pan-Arabic orientation. But the SPLA declined to attend (Ibid).

However, as early as December 1989, the new regime initiated direct talks with SPLA to start in Nairobi. As the SPLA was willing to talk on the proposed federal matters, but not interested to talk on the regime’s decision not to suspend the ‘September 1983 Laws’\(^5\), the initiative broke down after one day (Quarterly Economic Review of Sudan in Salih, 1990:223). The SPLA started to reflect its interest that it will reject any solution\(^6\) in the country that does not abolish sharia law in the whole of Sudan not just on certain states or regions (Al-Anba in Salih, 1990:223). By this time the regime already declared Jihad on the people of South Sudan and used it as an instrument of escalating the war in the area. Al-Bashir also decide to find a military solution in South Sudan (Kaballo, 1993:107).

The SPLA believes that its cause is not confined to the south rather encompasses the whole of Sudan. Its ultimate goal became not to separate the south from the north rather to create a secular, non-racial and federal Sudan (Kebede, 1997:5). This was the sole aim of the movement until late 1990s. This is, however, against the policies of the new and old governments of Sudan. To accomplish its objective, the SPLA especially in the late 1980s opened an offensive on the government forces in various locations in the south and captured many towns from the government. This helped to move further outside of the south and encroached to Blue Nile and Kordofan provinces. It was at this time that the garrison towns of Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal provinces were controlled by the SPLA. Early 1989 become the control of almost all of South Sudan (Ibid). This forced the Sudan leadership to consider a political solution as it was difficult by the time to win the SPLA by military means. However, the early 1990s were bad for the movement.

With the regime change in Ethiopia which was a second home and place of birth as well source of every aspect of support for the SPLA, the movement entered to a deep rooted division due to its traditional rivalries and power struggles inside the leadership. The SPLA/M effectively divided between the Dinka faction and the Nuer faction: the SPLA/M main stream under the leadership of its founding father, John Garang, and its faction SPLA/M United under the leadership of the Nuer, Riak Machar with his two colleagues\(^7\). The leadership of Al-Bashir used the opportunity and exploited to foment destructive conflict in this inter and intra-SPLA/M rivalry. Khartoum supplied weapons and bribes to the Nuer guerrilla forces and able to sustain this fighting to regain its lost territories in the late 1980s to the SPLA (Ibid: 8).

But the SPLA could not be reduced militarily given the military superiority on the other side. Though the faction with its changed name Southern Sudan Independence Movement abled to negotiate a political solution with the government in 1997 and fought the SPLA together; it could not succeed in its deal. Khartoum betrayed several times and used it as a playing card against the mainstream SPLA (Rone, 2003:506). Now the SPLA was able to rearm itself using the support of neighbouring countries. Especially in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Democratic Republic of Congo the changed governments with their politics helped the SPLA in the late 1990s after its conflict with the faction\(^8\) (Kebede, 1997:7). In the mid-1997, the movement controlled two-third of South Sudan from the government forces (Ibid: 8).

However, it was only in January 2002 that Riek Machar and the SPLA declared their reunification after 11 years of divorce (Rone, 2003:507) that attended destructive conflict. The military victory of the SPLA against the government forces followed by the peace deal with Machar, created a good bargaining position for the SPLA for any attempt of potential negotiation for a political solution in the conflict by the international community. This time the long initiated and negotiated process by the regional body of Intergovernmental Authority for Development to mediate the government

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\(^4\)Several coalition governments including Sadiq al-Mahdi’s coalition government, the last one at this time, failed in Sudan.

\(^5\)These are Islamic sharia laws declared in Sudan and generally called September Laws.

\(^6\)Additional peace talks initiated by the Nigerian government in Abuja in 1991 and 1993 also failed due to the fact that the Islamist fundamentalist regime (as the international community calls it in the 1990s) imposed its program of an Islamist state on the non-Muslim people of South Sudan.


\(^8\)This helped it to regain the lost territory in October 1995, May 1996, first half of 1997.
in Khartoum and SPLM in 1993 finally led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 9 January 2005 that officially ended the two decades long conflict.

4. POST-2011 SUDAN–SOUTH SUDAN RELATIONS

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement created the semi-autonomous South Sudan and the Government of National Unity in Khartoum on 9 January 2005. However, it failed to make unity attractive which led to the referendum of 9 January 2011 for the people of South Sudan to decide their fate either to be part of the Republic of Sudan or opt for a new separate state of their own. As it was increasingly predicted, South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly 98.83% in favour of independent South Sudan. Khartoum immediately responded by being the first country to officially recognize the independence of South Sudan in an official ceremony in Juba. Even Aljazeera English News argued that this recognition was hours before the formal split between the two took place. At the same time, Khartoum promised to work together for the newly born state (09 July 2011).

However, the successful ending of the referendum, the official declaration of independence and its recognition first by Khartoum (accepting the outcome of the referendum) does not mean the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is fully implemented if they want to lead peaceful neighbourly relations in the future. There are some key issues in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that the two countries failed to implement that will become major impediments to security and cooperation in their future relations. The future of Abyei, the border demarcation, citizenship and how to share the oil revenue are some of the key issues left out for future negotiation.

The future of Abyei is one of the major contentious issues in the relations of the two countries. The Abyei Protocol in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement outlined the issues for administration, the sharing of local oil revenues, and guaranteeing continued access to traditional grazing rights for both of the communities living in the area, mainly the Ngok Dinka and the Missirya (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005:65). But the Missirya are Arab nomads inclined to Sudan and the Ngok are black Africans belonging to South Sudan. By displacing the Ngok, Al-Bashir is bringing more Arabs to Abyei (Johnson, 2007:18) to strengthen his claims over this contested oil flash point that became a headache in their interstate relations and in the negotiations in other areas. There were also widely held views that there will be a 50% possibility of the return to war as one head of SPLA in September 2010 forecasted (Lewis, 2009:13) due to lack of positive initiative from northern elites to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, preferring fighting to forcefully control the oil resources such as in Abyei. For example, the town of Abyei was destroyed in 2008 in the fighting between the then semi-autonomous South Sudan and Sudan. However, in mid-2011 the two countries under the African Union mediation team led by Thabo Mbeki reached a breakthrough to demilitarize Abyei using the presence of UN peace keeping forces (Kock, 28/06/2011). The two states agreed and then the UN deployed 4200 Ethiopian peace keeping soldiers to Abyei (Ibid). Relative peace is observed in Abyei afterwards.

However, as that of Abyei, the border demarcation between Sudan and South Sudan is to follow the historical baseline of provincial boundaries at the time of Sudan’s Independence Day (1 January 1956). They established the North-South Boundary Technical Committee that only included Sudanese experts/representatives (Johnson, 2007:18). But trans-border conflict around the oil fields of South Sudan by militias supported by the two Sudan’s, frequent bombing of the northern border areas of South Sudan by Sudan’s planes are occurring and are all the daily news to the international community.

However, recent days showed some interest from the two parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to continue to agree on the remaining issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in general and border demarcation in particular. Accordingly, "the two countries agreed to start immediately to draw the northern border of the breakaway South Sudan with the Sudan and to end it within three months.” This will include only the areas they fully agreed to draw the line. However, besides Abyei there are four areas that the two countries failed to agree that needs future negotiations 9 (Sudan Tribune, 17 February 2012).

9The two parties diverge over the ownership of KefiaKingi on the border between South Darfur and Western Bahr el Ghazal; Kakah between South Kordofan and Upper Nile and the two areas of Jodah and Almqnas on the border of White Nile with Upper Nile (for details see Sudan Tribune, Friday 17 February 2012).
Similarly, the issue of how to solve citizenship/the future of southerners living in the north remains open even though Khartoum is frightening the south by putting a deadline (8 April 2012) (Sudan Tribune, 18 February 2012) to change their status of citizenship and consider them as foreigners in the north that will have an immediate effect in their life.

As far as the issue of oil revenue is concerned, with the declaration of independence 9 July 2011 50% equal share deal of the oil revenue between Sudan and South Sudan ended. But South Sudan continued to use the oil pipelines of Sudan and for that South Sudan used to pay transit fees for its crude oil. But recently, Khartoum complained that "Juba did not pay months’ worth of oil transit fees" (Sudan Tribune, 29 February 2012). But Juba accused Khartoum in stealing and confiscating of its oil in its way to international market through Port Sudan. As a result, around late 2011, South Sudan decided to stop completely the 350, 000 barrels a day production of oil (Sudan Tribune, 8 February 2012) declaring a deadlock on the oil revenue sharing deal in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This is followed by wars of words, hostile gestures and military threats of each other in their relations. The African Union mediation team interfered on the issue and are trying to mediate the oil impasse (Sudan Tribune, 29 February 2012).

But the two states failed to agree on the amount of fee South Sudan has to pay for the pipeline. Juba argues sometime 74 cents and other time $1 per barrel is a fair deal and Khartoum on its side presented $32 to $34 per barrel fee for the pipelines to transport the oil to Port Sudan for international market. The African Union team and the two states failed to narrow the huge gap in their interest on the oil fee (Ibid). But it is argued that the major issue is Sudan’s stealing or confiscation of South Sudan’s oil that cost $850 million to compensate its lost revenues in oil (Voice of America News, 27 January 2012). This in the meantime shifted to a related complains of the transit fee for oil by Sudan. Using these developing issues as immediate causes, the two countries entered to military threats.

The African Union team mediated for some time and succeeded in reaching an agreement for the states who are pressing on war of words and military threats. Both states agreed and signed a Non-Aggression Pact under the African Union mediation team on 10 February 2012. The pact states that the two states will "respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity" and to "refrain from launching any attack, including bombardment" (Sudan Tribune, 11 February 2012). However, with so many remaining issues unsolved in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and on issues that developed latter such additional deals may not be respected as problems may sustain for the future. This, however, needs further investigation.

5. CONCLUSION

Sudan-South Sudan relations since 1955, except with some important cooperation gestures during Numeiri regime under the Addis Ababa Agreement and now with Al-Beshir in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement framework, is largely surrounded by destructive conflicts. The rigid and pro-Islamic political culture of Sudan negatively influenced the relations of these countries in the last half century. However, the British colonial system in the area that finally became pro-Islamic (for northern Sudan and Egypt) of course takes the loins share for the developed conflict and mistrust between the two regions which became two states recently. On the basis of this analysis, the following concluding remarks can be established:

Reaching an agreement in a conflict without the participation of all active political actors such as armed groups and opposition political parties would lead to unsustainability of peace agreements and relations. This also is a time bomb for these nations operating in unpredictable political systems. This is the main issue in Sudan and South Sudan in the past that affected their relations. It is also continuing in their relations in a new political and economic environment. Hence, it is desirable to make any agreement of political/economic nature to be an all-inclusive for the sake of far reaching positive incentives for these nations.

There is a need for radical compromises in some key deadlocks in Sudan-South Sudan relations for maintaining of peace, neighbourly relations and continued coexistence in a mutual win-win scenario. Lessons can be drawn from the key radical policy majors taken under Numeiri in South Sudan. The international community should act tirelessly in influencing and mediating the two states to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that will avoid future and continuing various forms of conflicts. Specifically, more pressure needs to be applied on Khartoum to move forward from its age-old rigid positions in its relations with Juba that will help to relax tensions between them. These are the only ways to become viable states living side to side. But as South Sudan is a newly born state there is the need to identify its demanding challenges and how it will come out successfully from its previous and continuing conflicts to become a viable state.
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